To the Second Decimal Point:
How the polls vied to predict the national vote, monitor the marginals and second-guess the Senate
Murray Goot
From a poll-watcher's perspective, three things made the 2010 election distinctive. One was the unprecedented number of pollsters and the competition among them for media space. For the first time, seven companies were involved nationally-five from the outset of the campaign, one towards the end and one after respondents' had cast their votes-with others involved in particular States or in private polling for the parties. Polling was conducted both nationally and in marginal seats. Almost all the polling was focused on the election for the House of Representatives; only one set of results pretended to offer any sort of guide to the Senate. And no fewer than four companies conducted exit polls or day-of-the-election surveys.
A second feature was the record number of polls in the public domain not paid for by the press. Three polling organisations did have contractual relations with the press: Newspoll with The Australian, Galaxy with News Limited's metropolitan dailies and Nielsen with The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald. But Galaxy also polled for Channel Nine, and three firms produced 'exit' polls or election-day polls for television: Galaxy for Channel Nine, Auspoll for Sky News and Morgan for Channel Seven. And of the seven companies that conducted national polls during the campaign, three paid for the fieldwork themselves: Morgan, which posted the results on its web site and sent them to about 10 000 email addresses, gave some of its findings first to Channel Seven; Essential Research, whose results were distributed to some 400 email addresses and posted on the Crikey web site; and JWS, whose findings were taken up and published by the Sydney Morning Herald.
The third difference was the unprecedented range of data-gathering techniques these firms deployed. Morgan used face-to-face interviewing, a tradition that dates from 1941 when it ran the Australian Gallup Poll; but it also used phone polling and text messaging-an Australian first-for its exit poll. Galaxy used the phone, but switched to face-to-face interviews for its exit poll-a mode also used by Auspoll for its exit poll. Newspoll used phone interviewing. Essential Research ran its polling online. And JWS had respondents enter their voting intentions into a computer via their telephone keypads. The proliferation of polls was driven by new, cheaper technologies-the Internet and automated telephone polling lowering the barrier to entry.
This chapter outlines what the pollsters said about their own accuracy-an important part of their post-election marketing-before looking at the ways in which a more dispassionate observer might assess their performance. It traces the ways in which the polls tracked the parties' fortunes. It examines the uneven performance of the polls in the marginal seats-seats where, as the contest tightened, the pollsters put in a lot of effort. And it looks at their poor performance in relation to the Senate-an arena into which only one of the polls ventured.
Which of the polls performed best? That depends on the criteria against which their performance is measured; in any event, the differences were not statistically significant. Where the polls ran into most trouble was in marginal seats where they used small samples. Are the polls getting worse at measuring party support? Notwithstanding the decline of landlines and response rates, they are not. Are the polls getting better? Again, the answer is no. Indeed, anyone guessing that the two-party preferred vote at every election since 1993 would be evenly split would have as good a record for accuracy as any of the three polling organisations that have provided estimates at each of the elections since that date.
Bragging Rights
The day after the election a number of the pollsters released their own assessments of their performance and that of their competitors, though the parties' vote share was still unclear. The Morgan poll-keen to calibrate the errors of its rivals to two decimal places-was first in, though not necessarily best dressed. ' As of now', declared Gary Morgan on the day of the election-when the vote count had Labor on 38.5 per cent (it would finish with 38 per cent), the Coalition on 43.5 per cent (43.6 per cent), the Greens at 11.4 per cent (11.8 per cent) and Others at 6.6 per cent (6.6 per cent)-'the 7 NEWS Morgan Poll is easily the most accurate of the 4 major polls'. Morgan's 'Two Party preferred had an average error of only 0.3 per cent', meaning 0.3 percentage points; its 'Primary vote average error' (based on its estimate of votes for Labor, the Coalition, the Greens and Others) 'was only 0.5 per cent-probably our most accurate forecast', though whether it was the 'most accurate' ever or simply the 'most accurate' of the four 'final' polls he had conducted for the 2010 election was unclear. In addition,
Morgan had 'correctly predicted a Green controlled Senate', had predicted that 'the Greens would win their first House of Representatives seat' and had been 'the first to predict a hung parliament' .
The poll on which Morgan based its claim to having produced 'easily the most accurate' poll was a strange hybrid-a mixture of initial interviews and selected 'follow-ups'. Morgan made no attempt to contact all the respondents; it simply assumed that the only respondents who might have changed their mind were the 'undecided' and those intending to vote Greens. While the original Morgan poll had the same two-party preferred count (51:49) as the adjusted poll, the average difference between the first-preference votes (Coalition, Labor, Greens, Other) and the election result was greater in the original poll (1 percentage point) than in the adjusted version (0.5 percentage points).
Another poll that might have formed the basis of its post-election comparison but did not was its day-of-the-election phone poll for Channel Seven. Described as an 'exit poll'-in fact, it was based on nationwide interviews on election day with respondents who had voted and those who had yet to vote-it reported a Labor two-party preferred vote of 51.5 per cent and a first-preference distribution of Liberal-Nationals 41.5 per cent, ALP 38.5 per cent, Greens 13 per cent and 7 per cent Other (Morgan 2010a) . Less accurate than Morgan's preelection poll in terms of the two-party preferred, it was no less accurate in terms of first preferences.
There was a third poll to which Morgan might have referred as well. Also described as an 'exit poll'-this time more accurately-it involved asking 2000 voters drawn from the Roy Morgan Elector Panel to text their vote to Morgan once they had voted. Since 'the original panel'-recruited over a number of years from Morgan's face-to-face surveys-was 'controlled' and 'their previous voting intention and their vote at the last election' in 2007 were 'known', it was 'possible to project from the sms [sic] "exit" poll', Morgan argued, 'to an Australia-wide vote'. While the response rate in this survey was high (1580 members of the panel responded), the last results, posted at 6.16 pm Eastern Standard Time, appear to have been entered into the system at 4 pm-two hours before polling booths in most of the country closed (Morgan 2010b 'It always seems risky to go with a number that's very different from other pollsters', Newspoll's chief executive officer, Martin O'Shannessy, was quoted as saying, 'but we have a very strict policy of always reporting the poll exactly and not adjusting it and that's why we reported this, not rounded in any way'. In fact, its 'very strict policy' of reporting the two-party preferred count to the first decimal point was relatively new; Newspoll had first adopted it in March 2009 on the eve of the Queensland election. This was the first national election at which Newspoll had reported its results to less than half a percentage point (Goot 2010, 78-80) . O'Shannessy said nothing about how well Newspoll had done in predicting the first-preference vote for the various parties-again, as in Queensland and subsequently South Australia, reported to the first decimal point.
On the performance of the Galaxy poll-a poll with a very good record-not one of the News Limited dailies was prepared to comment. While the report in The Australian seemed happy enough to dismiss it-Newspoll and Galaxy were keen rivals-none of the other newspapers was prepared to defend it. Galaxy, however, was not to be counted out. On its web site, it insisted that its polling, which had shown Labor's two-party preferred vote at 50-52 per cent from the time Gillard became Prime Minister through to the election, was '[a] remarkable feat of consistency' (though what this proves is unclear); that it had predicted 'the closeness of the election' (though not the closeness that Newspoll had predicted); and that its 'Superpoll' in the last week of the campaign (discussed below) had 'provided the best guide to the swings in each of the states of all the published polls' (Galaxy 2010 Each of these assessments-from The Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age-was confined to the way the polls had measured up to the twoparty preferred vote. This was also true of The Canberra Times (2010) , the only other daily to comment on the performance of the polls. Not until 1993 had all the polls published a two-party preferred figure (Goot 2009, 126) . Now the twoparty preferred score seemed to be the only measure that mattered.
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…
Once the results were finally declared, the two-party preferred figures looked slightly different. So did the first preferences. If we focus on first preferencesthe way polls everywhere else in the world are judged-there is more than one measure we can apply. With a variety of measures, a poll that scores well on one measure-whether it is the two-party preferred or some other measure-will not necessarily score well on others.
Labor's final two-party preferred margin was not 50.7 per cent, as it appeared on election night, but 50.1 per cent. On this measure, Newspoll, which had Labor on 50.2 per cent, performed best; it would have taken an even greater measure of luck to have performed any better. As Table 6 .1 (pre-election polls) and Table 6 .2 (election-day polls) show, the Essential poll, conducted online in the last week of the campaign, the Morgan pre-election phone poll, whether in its original or its adjusted form, the Morgan day-of-the-election (SMS) poll and the Auspoll were the next best with a Labor two-party preferred count of 51 per cent. These were followed by Morgan's day-of-the-election phone poll (51.5 per cent). Tied, at the back of the field, came half-a-dozen others: Morgan's final face-to-face poll, the final Nielsen phone poll, the two JWS automated phone polls (its campaign poll and its day-of-the-election poll) and the two Galaxy phone polls (its last campaign poll and its exit poll), all of which had Labor on 52 per cent. Morgan, with four runners in the race-almost certainly a world first-had two in the third (or second-last) bunch of finishers and two in the fourth (or last). Does the order of merit change if we change the measure of success from predicting the two-party preferred to one of predicting the primary or firstpreference vote? In boasting of their success, both Morgan and Newspoll noted, after the final results were in, that the 'error' of their estimates for each of the parties was 1 percentage point or less-'well within the expected sampling error', Newspoll added, 'of +/-2 percentage points' (Levine et al. 2010, 16; Morgan et al. 2010 for the poll cited in Levine et al. 2010; Newspoll 2010) .
To compare like with like, we need to focus on those parties-Labor, the LNP (taken as a single entity), the Greens and 'Other' (the parties and Independents that make up the rest)-for which all the polls provided estimates (see Table 6 .3a). On this measure, the Essential poll had an average error of just 0.3 percentage points. The next most accurate were three of the Morgan polls: the last of its preelection phone polls (0.7), the phone poll taken on the day of the election (0.7) and the one taken on the day of the election via SMS (0.8). Less accurate were the final campaign polls conducted by Newspoll (1.1) and Nielsen (1.1), the last Galaxy poll of the campaign (1.3), and the day-of-the-election poll conducted by JWS (1.3). Least accurate were the JWS poll (1.6) and Morgan's face-to-face poll (1.9) completed six days before the election-three to four days before any of the other final pre-election polls; and two day-of-the-election polls, Galaxy (1.7) and Auspoll (1.8), conducted in less than one-quarter of the seats. (Given that Galaxy and Auspoll would have been delighted to have come up with figures that matched the national result, and in the absence of any statement about the electorates/polling booths they sampled, it seems reasonable-if less than ideal-to assess them on the same basis as their competitors.) If the polls taken early in the last week confirm one maxim-where voting intentions change, timing matters-the polls on election day confirm another: it is foolish to judge the whole electorate on the basis of sampling its (unspecified) parts. Since some polls estimated the distribution of the vote for a larger number of parties than just those with the most substantial support (Labor, the LNP, the Greens plus Others), we can also measure the polls' performance by adopting a horses-for-courses principle-that is, by calculating the average error for each of the parties for which the polls provided an estimate (see Table 6 .3b). On this measure, the order of merit is much the same, though there is nothing to choose between the Essential poll (0.6)-now looking slightly worse-and the two Morgan day-of-the-election polls (0.5, 0.6) at the top, followed by: the Morgan (0.8) and Nielsen (0.9) phone polls conducted in the last week of the campaign; the campaign polls of Galaxy (1) and Newspoll (1.1); the JWS day-of-the-election poll (1.3); with the Morgan face-to-face poll (1.5), the JWS campaign poll (1.6) and the exit Auspoll (1.8) retaining their places at the bottom. On any of these measures-two-party preferred, the parties for which all the polls offered estimates, and the estimates for the parties offered by each poll-there is no evidence of the polls doing either significantly better or significantly worse, in strictly statistical terms, than in the past. Nonetheless, some outperformed while others under-performed their medium or long-term average. In terms of the two-party preferred figures (Table 6 .4), Galaxy recorded a relatively poor result. It overestimated Labor's lead by 1.9 percentage points in both its pre-election and its day-of-the-election polls; in 2004 and 2007, it had underestimated first the Coalition's, and then Labor's, winning lead, by just 0.7 percentage points. Nielsen, with the same size error, actually did markedly better than in 2007; its 2010 figure brought it back into line with its longterm average. Morgan's phone polls were slightly more accurate than their longterm average (though the variance in Morgan's performance has been high); Morgan's face-to-face poll-out by 1.9 percentage points-also beat its longterm average, which has been poor (see also Jackman 2005). Newspoll, too, outperformed its long-term average, while Auspoll did almost as well in 2010 as it did in 2007. In terms of the first preferences that all the polls reported-for the ALP, LNP, the Greens and Others-Newspoll's performance was better than its long-term average, as were Nielsen's and Morgan's (both phone and face-to-face). Galaxy was the one poll to do noticeably worse than in 2004 or 2007 (Table 6 .5a). In terms of the first preferences reported by individual polls-and for Newspoll and Galaxy these were the same as those reported by all the polls-the story is much the same. Nielsen-with its best figures since at least 1987-and Morgan did a bit better than average. Galaxy-whose record had made it think of itself as the best poll in the country-did worse than in 2004 or 2007. Most striking, perhaps, is how similar the long-term performance of Morgan, Nielsen, Newspoll and Galaxy has been-from one end (Galaxy, with an average error of 0.9 percentage points) to the other (Nielsen on 1.5), the range is just 0.6 percentage points (Table 6 .5b). Notes: The period dates from the first national election to include Newspoll; the number in square brackets indicates the number of parties for which each poll provided an estimate; mean is weighted; where separate estimates are provided, Liberal and Nationals are treated as two and the combined figure for the LNP is ignored; minor parties for which no estimates are provided are treated as 'Other'.
The Marginals
Overwhelmingly, the marginal-seat polling done for the press was commissioned in the last two weeks of the campaign by News Limited: The Weekend Australian, through Newspoll, and the metropolitan tabloids through Galaxy. Individual papers, including News Limited's Adelaide Advertiser, also commissioned or conducted marginal-seat polling of their own. In addition, Galaxy ran a marginal-seat poll for Channel Nine, and marginal-seat polling was conducted independently of the press (and of the parties) by JWS, which boosted it samples in marginal seats, and by Morgan. Mackerras 1975, 5) -it also fitted the definition of 'ultra-marginal' (requiring a swing of up to 4.9 percentage points) rather than 'marginal' (requiring a swing of between 5 and 9.9 percentage points) developed by Hughes (1977, 281) .
The results-released on the weekend before the election-pointed to a swing against Labor of 1.3 percentage points in New South Wales, which was a more modest swing than the aggregate data suggested but enough to cost it four of its eight most marginal seats; they suggested a swing against Labor of 3.4 percentage points in Queensland, which again was smaller than it might have expected but enough to cost it all six of its most marginal seats; and they indicated a swing to Labor of 6.2 percentage points in Victoria, which was completely out of line with its data for Victoria as a whole and enough to cost the Liberals at least five and possibly nine of its most marginal seats (TheWeekend Australian, 14-15 August 2010). No reference was made, however, to the differences between the State-by-State data it had published from its national polls and the data from these marginal-seat polls. Earlier, Newspoll had reported that Labor was ahead in the NSW marginal seat of Lindsay (n = 609), where it had a buffer of 6.4 percentage points, but behind in Dawson (n = 601) (The Weekend Australian, 7-8 August 2010).
In their last pre-election editions-published the day after the In Queensland, a Galaxy poll conducted during the last week of the campaign (15-16 August) for The Courier-Mail in four of Labor's ultra-marginalsHerbert, Longman, Forde and Bonner-revealed a similar swing with Labor trailing, 38:44 or 49:51 two-party preferred, which was an anti-Labor two-party preferred swing of about 3.5 percentage points. 'If such a swing was observed on a uniform basis across marginal electorates in Queensland', Briggs observed, 'this would result in the government losing six seats'. Keen to generalise the poll's findings, the paper led with a statement not about the four seats but about 'Labor in pain in six seats'. What the headline ignored was the last paragraph in the story, which referred to a 'separate Galaxy poll in the Sunday Mail' that 'showed a 5.4 per cent swing against the Government' in four other Labor ultramarginals: 'Bowman, Dawson, Dickson and Flynn' (Balogh 2010) . On that basis, the paper might have generalised not to six seats but to as many as ten.
The JWS Research poll, with 28 000 respondents, also conducted in the final week, included a 'boost sample' of more than 22 000 drawn from '54 key marginals', ranging from Lindsay in New South Wales, held by Labor on a margin of 6.3 percentage points, to McMillan in Victoria, held by the Liberals on a margin of 4.8 percentage points. Published as an 'exclusive' on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald (19 August 2010), though not commissioned by it, the JWS poll was the biggest rollcall of individual marginal seats published in the course of an election by any Australian polling organisation; indeed, with its having made upwards of 250 000 calls to get a response of this size, it was the biggest polling effort undertaken by anyone in Australia in a single weekend.
It was also one of the most controversial, with the Association of Market and Social Research Organisations issuing-and then hastily withdrawing-a statement attacking its 'standards', the 'low participation rate' and the 'vast numbers of people' likely to end up 'annoyed' (see Burgess 2010 (Kelton 2010) and Patterson five out of five.
Of the predictions generated by the JWS day-of-the-election automated phone poll, no less than one-third turned out to be wrong. Among the 18 marginal seats it expected Labor to hold were five it lost (Bennelong and Macquarie, NSW; Hasluck and Swan, WA; Solomon, NT); among the 15 it expected Labor to lose were four it held (Lindsay and Robertson, NSW; Moreton, Qld; Corangamite, Vic.); and among the six it expected the Coalition to lose were four it held (McEwen and La Trobe, Vic.; Boothby, SA; Stirling, WA).
The Senate
Compared with the contest for the House of Representatives, the contest for the Senate attracted little attention. If the number of pollsters lining up to measure the parties' electoral support in the House of Representatives continues to grow, the number lining up for the Senate has fallen. In 2004-an unusual election that saw the government win a majority in the Senate-there were three polls: ACNielsen, Morgan and an ANU online poll (Goot 2005, 65-7) . In 2007, there were two: Morgan and Galaxy (Goot 2009, 128-30) . In 2010, however, there was just one. Even so, it was not the press that commissioned the poll; it was Morgan that chanced its arm.
Encouraged by the prospect of being the first poll to declare the Greens would hold the balance of power, Morgan went into the field early. Its series of faceto-face polls, from which it extracted its findings on the Senate, was conducted in different States at different times, with all the surveys under way before the election was announced and completed when the election campaign still had some way to run. In New South Wales (n = 1195) and Victoria (n = 731), the polling was conducted in July; in Queensland (n = 1497), South Australia (n = 591) and Western Australia (n = 622), it was conducted in June-July; in Tasmania (n = 451), in May-July; and in the Australian Capital Territory (n = 446), in February-July (Morgan 2010c 
Conclusion
Based on their national estimates for the House of Representatives, the polls did well. Few tipped a hung parliament, but none tipped a Coalition victory. All the polls overestimated Labor's lead but all were within the margin of error. There was no sign that the increasing difficulty of reaching the required number and kind of respondents affected the polls adversely. While some polls were a little better than others, it was not a case of winner takes all. The poll that came closest to estimating each side's final share of the two-party preferred vote did not come out trumps on other criteria. Nor did phone polls always beat online polls or polls conducted via text messaging. While Newspoll stood out for its estimate of the two-party preferred count, it was the online Essential poll, followed by the Morgan phone polls (before the election and on election day) and the Morgan poll via SMS, that did best in estimating the parties' shares of first preferences. Nor was a two-party preferred count calculated on the basis of the 2007 results-Newspoll, for example-necessarily less accurate than one based on asking respondents directly.
Polling in the marginals was a good deal less impressive, with a number of seats being called by Galaxy and Newspoll-and more especially by Morgan and JWS-falling for the wrong side of the ledger. This could partly reflect the fact that things can change one way in one seat and in the opposite way in another seat-phenomena that wash out in the aggregate. But it is more likely to underline the most basic truth about survey research: sampling variance is not a function of the size of the population but a function of the size of the sample. As this election showed, yet again, conducting polls with very small samples in a number of seats and then focusing on how many interviews one has secured in the aggregate does not get around this problem; in close contests-and marginal seats fit this description almost by definition-sample sizes of 400 (JWS) let alone 200 (Galaxy and Newspoll) are too small.
With the Senate, the problem was less one of predicting the number of seats than of accurately estimating the parties' shares of the vote. While Morgan was able (almost) to predict the number of seats the Greens would win, and trumpeted that they would hold the 'balance of power' (something that was not really in doubt), it did poorly in estimating the parties' shares of the vote. Its samples were not big enough and it polled too early but it also did not fully inform respondents about which parties were running.
Measured against their final national figures, two-party preferred, for the House of Representatives, the differences among the polls are small; even the least accurate of the polls-and no fewer than six of the 12 final pre-election or dayof-the-election polls tied for this title-came within 2 percentage points of the correct result. In political terms, a difference of this magnitude can make a world of difference; but in statistical terms, it is not a matter of great consequence. To be sure, there is also the matter of bragging rights. But over the long term, differences between the polls are even smaller than the 2010 figures might suggest. Since 1993, when the pollsters began to report a two-party preferred count, the average two-party preferred error for the phone polls conducted by Newspoll has been 1.4, for Morgan 1.8 and for Nielsen 2.0 percentage points-a range across the three organisations not of 1.8 (the difference in 2010 between 1.9 for Nielsen and 0.1 for Newspoll) but of just 0.6 percentage points.
But while the average errors recorded by each of these organisations over the past seven or eight elections have been perfectly respectable, they have been far from remarkable. Writing nearly 40 years ago, David Butler suggested that if 'an enterprising rogue had set up a pseudo-poll that conducted no interviews' but simply worked on the assumption that at every election Labor and the Coalition would each get 46 per cent of the first-preference vote, they 'would not have had too bad a record'-an average error between 1958 and 1972 of 'under 2½' percentage points (Butler 1973, 114) . In a similar vein, we can now say that if in 1993 an enterprising rogue had set up a pseudo-poll that conducted no interviews but simply worked on the assumption that at every election Labor would get 50 per cent of the two-party preferred vote, he or she would have an even better record-an average error of just 1.8 percentage points. As it happens, 1.8 percentage points is the median error for the three polls-Newspoll, Morgan and Nielsen-with records that stretch back to 1993. Moreover, the range of deviations (0.2-3.6 percentage points) from a 50:50 two-party preferred result in elections held since then is not very different from the range of errors recorded by the polls (0.1-4.3 percentage points).
The point here is not to suggest that any of the pollsters are rogues; rather, as Butler put it, it is to show 'how limited has been the possibility of error' (Butler 1973, 114) . Indeed, if one can work out which party is likely to get the majority of the two-party preferred vote-generally, not a difficult task-the possibility of error is even less. Operating in a competitive polling environment and able to take advantage of a late or last-mover advantage because one pollster can see what another has reported (Goot 2009, 128) reduces the possibility of error further. The increasing emphasis on the two-party preferred count as the measure of a poll's success might help to explain why the number of market research firms involved in polling has increased in recent years and why the methods deployed by the industry have expanded.
